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Defendant’s credit card payments represented current obligations owed in conjunction with the same marital dissolution in which modification of support payments was being sought; they were not “prior” within the meaning of subdivision (a)(3)(g), and therefore not deductible, as they were not obligations to a “family that is first in time in relation to another family.” In re Benish.
 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the day care costs evenly between parents in addition to awarding child support. In re Serna.
 Nothing in the record demonstrated that the depreciation expenses claimed on taxpayer’s forms were utilized to repay an outstanding debt, nor was any specific repayment schedule provided as a result of the expense, thus the expense did not fall into the category of debt repayment. In re Nelson.
 The word “necessary” as used in subdivision (a)(3)(h) was intended to describe those expenses outlaid by a parent with a good faith belief his or her income would increases as a result, and which actually did act to increase income, or would have done so absent some extenuating circumstances. In re Davis.
 Simply because an expense falls into the category of a debt repayment does not mean that it is necessarily deductible from gross income for child support payments; merely qualifying as a deductibility under subdivision (a)(3)(h). In re Davis.
 A father was denied his right to a full hearing on the issue whether he had a valid excuse for not complying with the court’s order to pay child support and medical bills where his counsel requested an opportunity to present evidence which would demonstrate that he was telling the truth when he stated that he had no funds and the court refused to permit him to adduce such evidence. In re Mayer.